1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
3	IN RE: VALSARTAN, LOSARTAN, CIVIL ACTION NUMBER:
4	and IRBESARTAN PRODUCTS 1:19-md-02875-RMB-SAK
5	LIABILITY LITIGATION Case Management Conference/ Status Conference
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7	Mitchell H. Cohen Building & U.S. Courthouse 4th and Cooper Streets
8 9	Camden, New Jersey 08101 Thursday, October 10, 2024 Commencing at 1:02 p.m.
10	B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE RENÉE MARIE BUMB, CHIEF
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, and THE HONORABLE THOMAS I. VANASKIE (RET.)
12	SPECIAL MASTER
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                     (Appearances continued onto next page)
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(PROCEEDINGS held in open court before the Honorable Renée Marie Bumb, Chief U.S. District Judge, and The Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie (Ret.) Special Master, at 1:02 p.m. as follows:) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good afternoon. MR. SLATER: Good afternoon, Judge. MS. ALLON: Good afternoon. MS. LOCKARD: Good afternoon. JUDGE VANASKIE: Good afternoon. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You can all have a seat. Thank you. Okay. Good to have you all here. Thank you all for being here. So let me start with appearances. We're in the valsartan matter. We'll start with the appearances. MR. SLATER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Adam Slater on behalf of the plaintiffs. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good afternoon. MR. HONIK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Ruben Honik for plaintiff. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Afternoon. MR. NIGH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Daniel Nigh for the plaintiffs. MS. WHITELEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Conlee Whiteley on behalf of plaintiffs.

1 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. That's it for the 2 plaintiffs; good afternoon. 3 Okay. For the defendants. MS. ALLON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Devora Allon 4 5 from Kirkland & Ellis for Torrent. 6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Afternoon. 7 MS. BRANCATO: Good afternoon. Alexia Brancato from 8 Kirkland, also for Torrent. 9 MR. OSTFELD: Greq Ostfeld from Greenberg Traurig for 10 Teva. 11 MS. LOCKARD: Victoria Lockard, Greenberg Traurig, 12 for Teva. 13 MS. DAVIDSON: Jessica Davidson, Skadden, Arps, for 14 the ZHP Defendants. 15 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. All right. Good afternoon. All right. So I'm happy to see you all here. 16 17 honest, I'm not sure where I want to start so we're just going 18 to have a conversation about it. 19 I have spent a significant amount of time really trying to get a handle on the case. And what I keep coming 20 21 back to is, I think the plaintiffs and the defendants are 22 trying two different cases. And I keep coming back to that. 23 The more I ask for submissions, the more I become convinced of 24 it, because I just think there's a lot of argument that's 25 getting mixed in with evidence. And so I'm hoping that we can

have a really robust conversation so I can figure it out and be comfortable with moving forward. Because if I don't have that comfort level, I'm not moving forward; I mean, I just can't.

So I guess I'm going to start with you, Mr. Slater, and Mr. Honik, or whoever wants to answer my question. And I will say that I have read and reread Judge Rosenberg's Opinion in the Zantac matter, which I have found to be very instructive. I've read it many times. I sort of feel a little bit like she felt, like she continued to flesh out the case and flesh out the case.

So I guess my first question is, Mr. Slater, are you trying a worthless, one word, or a worth less, two word, case? That's my first question.

MR. SLATER: Our position is that -- and I think we're focusing on the warranty claim. We talked about that.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I only want to focus on the warranty claim, because that has what's consumed all of our energies right now, but, yes.

MR. SLATER: Okay. Because the warranty claim values the product at the time of sale, our position is that because of the status of the product being contaminated as it was, that there was no value to that product because nobody would buy it knowing the contamination existed, and it was not sellable in that form.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: And the defendants have agreed that it should not have been sold like that. I think -- so our position is there was no value.

Taking your rulings into account, however, my understanding is that your ruling is, that may be so. And we are not arguing another world. We're saying in the world where they were actually sold, our position is they shouldn't have been and they didn't have value for the reasons I said; but your ruling is, that may be so, but they were sold. And in the real world people bought them and it helped them from a medical standpoint. Shouldn't that be factored in? Shouldn't the defendant be allowed to say, it may be that we shouldn't have sold it, but we did and you got value anyway?

And in terms of valuing the drug, even though the risk may not have been acceptable to sell it, it was sold and you got value, so the defendants are allowed to say, well, the plaintiffs didn't get no value, they got some value, because they got efficacy.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And your response to that is?

MR. SLATER: Our response is that it's a jury

question. Your Honor has framed it as a jury question. So our

response is, we understand that that's where the trial is going

so, therefore, we'll make our arguments.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What's your argument?

25 MR. SLATER: In terms of why there's no value?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.

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MR. SLATER: Again, because the product was contaminated in such a way with what we know was in it.

Everybody agrees it could not have been sold or should not have been sold. So, therefore, based on the warranty law, there was no value to that, because --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You can't make that argument. That's argument. That's what I'm -- this is what I'm struggling with.

MR. SLATER: Well -- oh, I'm sorry.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's argument. That is an argument. You can't argue to the jury let's pretend the facts don't apply in this case and let's just pretend that these should never have been sold from the first place. You can't make that argument.

MR. SLATER: I'm glad you asked me that, because we're not -- we're not saying it didn't happen.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.

MR. SLATER: What we're saying is it shouldn't have happened, okay. And we're saying that as a matter of how the law applies to these drugs, it never should have been sold.

And we also argue that it may — this is not an argument. This is the evidence. And our regulatory expert, Dr. Plunkett, can frame this.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What's the -- tell me the

evidence, because this is what I hear the plaintiff saying, and I don't think it's a permissible argument.

I keep hearing the -- this is how I hear the plaintiff presenting it to the jury: It's so because we say it's so. It's so because once the FDA recalled the drug, it is ipse dixit evidence that it shouldn't have been sold from day one and, therefore, since it shouldn't have been sold from day one, it doesn't have any value. And Judge Rosenberg rejected that position. And I think that her reasoning is very solid.

And so there had to be some value at the time of sale because it was sold. The plaintiffs benefited from it for a period of years until there was a recall.

And the other thing that I think has not been focused on is that there is a big disconnect between the cases that talk about sales post-recall versus sales pre-recall. And I think that -- and, again, Judge Rosenberg talked about it, the cases talked about it, I brought it up in my letter order to the parties. I think we have to be very careful that when we argue to a jury that the drug had no value, those cases are the drug in post-recall.

I see your colleague shaking his head, but tell me a case where it's not.

MR. SLATER: Okay. I think the *Debernardis*, I think that's the name of the case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case --

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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Unique on its facts, very unique
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     on its facts.
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               MR. SLATER: Similar to our facts, though.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, not at all.
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               MR. SLATER: Because it was a later finding for
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     products that had been sold and provided value to people for
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     years.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And there was a recall, and they
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     should not have sold them post-recall.
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               MR. SLATER: But they were given damages, and they
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     were allowed to ask for the refund going back to the beginning.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But they didn't arque to the jury
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     that they had no value because they should never have been
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     sold.
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               MR. SLATER: I think that is what they argued, Your
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     Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. And not to mention that that
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     was on a motion to dismiss on top of it. So I think you got a
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     problem there.
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               MR. SLATER: Well, I mean --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's a motion to dismiss.
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               So let me tell you why that's important, because on a
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     motion to dismiss, I think it's very -- here's the thing, is
     that, again, I keep going back to sugar pills. If at the end
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     of the day the recall was because these were sugar pills which
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     had no value, then I think it's a plausible argument because I
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     think it can be supported by evidence that they had no value,
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     zero value because they were sugar pills.
               That's why the facts matter here. And, you know, as
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     I've thought about the plaintiffs' argument over and over
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     again, would you be standing before me making the same
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     argument, let's pretend, if at the time of the sale the
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     warranty was we are going to be providing red valsartan pills
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     and they turn out they're green?
               MR. SLATER: No, we wouldn't, because that --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Because?
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               MR. SLATER: Because that would not be, from our
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     perspective, material enough to support the argument that we're
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     going to make.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Exactly.
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               MR. SLATER: But the materiality here is patent.
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     you asked about the facts that we are going to establish, so I
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     think it's very important to --
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: How do you -- let's stick with
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     materiality because I think that's an important word. How do
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     you get to material or materiality without causation?
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               MR. SLATER:
                            The materiality is established by the
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     fact that the pills -- that the contamination with these
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     impurities --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                  Yes.
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               MR. SLATER: -- rendered the products, in terms of
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     what was supposed to happen, as not what they were said to be.
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     What they were sold as was valsartan USP, the approved, valid,
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     consistent with the compendium valsartan.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me change the facts.
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               There's a little speck of flour in them, FDA recalls
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     them later because, you know, drugs shouldn't have a little
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     speck of flour in them. Your argument?
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               MR. SLATER: I wouldn't be bringing that case.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Your argument?
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               MR. SLATER: My argument is that the materiality of
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     that is -- we're not talking about a health risk, I assume, in
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     your hypothetical. There's no risk to health. That's not
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     something that you have years of regulatory guidances
     precluding it, where there's analysis by the ICH Guidelines and
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     the FDA saying genotoxic probable human carcinogens are treated
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     differently than all other impurities and there's special
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     regulations for those. Flour doesn't fall into that category.
     So the --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So I think you're talking yourself
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     into the issue that I'm very concerned about.
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               I think that what the plaintiff is trying to do is to
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     have it both ways, is to stand up before this jury and say:
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     "These drugs should never have been sold, period. They have no
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     value."
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The plaintiffs want to phrase it in terms of a
regulatory risk. I see no difference between a regulatory risk
and a biological risk, but we'll get there. Because I think it
then leaves a jury, you know, this elephant in the room with
risk of what, without mentioning the word "cancer," and then
tying the defendants' hands by not being allowed to prove that
it does not cause cancer.
          MR. SLATER: Well --
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I don't think -- I think that
deprives the defendants of their day in court.
          MR. SLATER: I don't agree, and I'll tell you why.
First of all, there's a lot that you're obviously putting
out --
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Been thinking about, yes.
          MR. SLATER: It seems like for a few minutes, so...
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't see this case much
different than the Zantac case; I don't.
          MR. SLATER:
                      It's a very different case than Zantac.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't see it.
          MR. SLATER: And I'll tell you why.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, it's a standing issue and
all of that, but I don't see this much different.
          MR. SLATER: It's very different, because in this
case -- I mean, if we want to get down into why this is
different, in our case, and it's very important to remember,
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originally these drugs were a branded drug called Diovan manufactured by what's called the tributyltin process. That was the branded approved, FDA-approved manufacturing process. When it came off patent, ZHP said, okay, we're going to copy that and we're going to now manufacture it and sell it a lot cheaper. And then what they did is they changed the process in 2011 and 2012, and that is the watershed moment in this case. They changed the process so they could make more money than they could make by using the FDA-approved process that went through clinical studies and was evaluated through the clinical studies. And what they failed to do is they failed to do proper change control and proper risk assessment before they ever started selling the zinc chloride or TEA with sodium nitrite quenching pills. You don't have any of that in the Zantac case. you have in Zantac is it turned out that because of the way the product was manufactured after it went out the door --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No; because it sat on the shelf for a while or whatever, it produced, you know, NDMA. MR. SLATER: NDMA. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. MR. SLATER: It's a completely different situation. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No.

MR. SLATER: Because this is a process impurity that was created in the factory on the manufacturing line when it was actually manufactured. And that's how it was sold with this impurity in it.

And, again, it was from the very beginning, because of their decision to change the manufacturing process in a way that violated the rules that say you have to do the proper risk assessment and change control process. So it's very different factually from Zantac.

And then what happens is, you're asking what are the facts that get us to say there's no value, again, we're talking the warranty claim here. A person walks up to the cash register and says I'd like valsartan, here's my prescription. They then — the formulary list for this person on their insurance company looks and says, okay, they can have this, this and this. And every one of them says valsartan USP. That's the warranty. If that warranty isn't there, it never gets sold by — nobody — the retailers have said they wouldn't have sold it.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It's valsartan with a contaminant.

MR. SLATER: Well, it is.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why do you keep trying to dress it up as something that it wasn't? It was valsartan but with a contaminant.

MR. SLATER: But what's more important is -- or maybe

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     it's just the flip-side, but I think it's important to say it
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     this way, it wasn't what they said it was.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. I understand all of that.
     But that doesn't give you the right, you, the plaintiffs, the
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     right to say to the jury that just because it wasn't what they
     said it was, we get -- we get a full refund because of the
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              It should never have been sold, period.
     recall.
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               MR. SLATER: Well, that's what --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. And I --
               MR. SLATER: That's the law of -- that's the law of
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     express warranty, Judge.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No.
                                       It's --
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               MR. SLATER: That is the law.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MR. SLATER: I mean, and I just want to say, I
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     understand that you want this to be fair, but the defendants
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     sold these drugs, misrepresented that they were USP Orange Book
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     compliant valsartan.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So then prove to the jury that you
     didn't get the "benefit of the bargain." But do not stand up
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     before the jury and say: "FDA recalled them so we should have
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     gotten -- we should have gotten a full refund."
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               MR. SLATER: Well, I mean, there's --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You've got to be able to -- this
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     is what the "benefit of the bargain" is. You've got to be able
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to introduce evidence to the jury as to what the value of these drugs was, i.e., were they efficacious or weren't they, and the defendants will do differently.

And, you know, I think the other thing that we have to be very careful about is, we can't conflate liability with damages, okay. And that's what I think the plaintiff is continuing to conflate, which is the plaintiff will get up and say, "Were these drugs adulterated?" You'll prove they were adulterated, whether they were adulterated or they weren't. You'll then prove damages. What are the amount of the damages? But what you can't argue to the jury is: "They had no value because the FDA recalled them."

MR. SLATER: We're saying --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You can't prove -- you can't argue that to the jury, just like Conti, whose testimony I found to be unreliable.

MR. SLATER: We're not saying that that is all there is to it. What we're saying is we're -- we are not -- again, we're in the real world where when people went to the cash register and they bought this, a warranty was made. And if that warranty had not been made, they would not have been purchased. Nobody would have purchased those drugs because they couldn't, as a matter of law.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You can't make that argument to the jury.

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               MR. SLATER: But that's the law, Judge.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, it's not.
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               MR. SLATER: And -- and the other --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's argument.
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               MR. SLATER: That's the evidence and the admissions
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     from every defense witness who was asked the question; that
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     once they knew there was NDMA in it, they knew this could never
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     be sold.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But that's a different case.
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     These are not the facts of this case. You want --
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               MR. SLATER:
                            So they get a pass?
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't know.
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               MR. SLATER: Because they got away with selling
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     the -- this is my problem, Judge: They sold the pills and
     they're saying, well, nobody caught on so, you know what --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That may go -- that may go to your
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     fraud claim. But I don't see how it goes to your express
     warranty claim.
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               MR. SLATER: And then they say -- and it turns out in
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     hindsight, even though we measure the damages at the cash
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     register, and that's the law, we've established that, our brief
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     I think was very compelling on that, that's when you measure
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     damages on the warranty claim is when the person buys it, do
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     they get the benefit of their bargain at the time of purchase.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's liability. Talk about
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1 damages. MR. SLATER: It's also damages, because if you don't 2 3 get the benefit of the bargain, under warranty law you're 4 allowed -- you are entitled to get your money back. 5 What you're letting them do --6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. But you just told me a few 7 moments ago that if it had flour in it, you're not getting the 8 benefit of your warranty because nobody would go to the 9 counter, presumably, and say, oh, can you give me some pills 10 with a little speck of flour in them. 11 MR. SLATER: Those hypotheticals don't apply to this 12 case. 13 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why? 14 MR. SLATER: Because it's not this case. You're 15 taking our case and you're watering it down with a hypothetical 16 that doesn't apply, Judge.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. I'm just trying to show you why the plaintiffs are wrong on the law.

MR. SLATER: We have -- we're -- under warranty law, this is -- and let me finish what I'm saying here. You're saying to us, okay, how can you say there's no value. We have the law that says this could not have been sold if they didn't give this false warranty.

If they said it's valsartan but it's not USP, it doesn't get on the formulary, it's, therefore, not approved by

the TPP, by the insurance company, and the retailer will not sell it. That is the law. That is the facts. It's agreed by everybody.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. I know, but Mr. Slater -MR. SLATER: So what they're doing -- I want to
finish with the efficacy issue, Your Honor, because I know that
that's what you're concerned about.

We're allowed to make our argument that there's no value because they should never have sold it; no one would ever have bought it if they knew.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I disagree.

MR. SLATER: So they then have -- you're letting them, though, say even though you valued the product at the time of sale, you're saying they can go back, though, years later and say, you know what, even though we shouldn't have sold it, they got some benefit from the therapeutic value so there's value so it shouldn't be -- you can't take away all of the -- you can't give a full refund because there was value. And they're going to make that argument to the jury. And that's where the horserace will be with the jury.

And Judge Kugler always said that -- and I know you know that -- this case is about the value. The jury has to decide what was the value.

We don't agree that they should be allowed to make that argument, but they're doing it, and we're not griping

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in your pills.

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about it, we're ready to deal with it, and the jury will decide
who's right and who's wrong based on the facts. This is not an
argument. This is the facts and the evidence, which is their
admissions. They could not sell it. They could not sell this
product.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Had they known that it contained a
contaminant.
         MR. SLATER:
                      Well --
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: They're not disputing that. But
what evidence are you going to introduce to a jury that this
should never have been sold in the first place and, therefore,
it's a zero value?
         MR. SLATER: Well, in terms of its --
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's strict liability to me.
         MR. SLATER: And we gave you the law; that warranty
law is akin to strict liability.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I didn't -- and I don't think
that that was --
         MR. SLATER: And they've given you no cases that say
to the contrary because that's what it is. Warranty law is
very straightforward and very simple. They represented this
was approved by the FDA to be sold, and it wasn't.
         And the fact that they didn't know about it doesn't
give them a break. You're not allowed to be ignorant of what's
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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me read from Judge Rosenberg's Opinion the following and then I'll have you respond to it.

So this is what -- gearing up to the adulteration theory, she writes: "The plaintiffs' adulteration theory of standing is not viable because it improperly relies on the FDA's ADI. The FDA established the ADI for NDMA in ranitidine around 2019. The plaintiffs' claim that ranitidine was adulterated as determined by Congress because it was sold with amounts of NDMA higher than level permitted by Congress," et cetera.

"In other words, it [sic] was adulterated because it contained levels exceeding the FDA's ADI; since it was adulterated, it was worthless; and since ranitidine was worthless, the plaintiffs suffered an economic injury-in-fact when they purchased it for a value greater than zero, without knowing that it contained NDMA."

She then goes on to rule — she contrasts the Debernardis case and says, "a plaintiff does not have standing to sue a defendant merely because of buyer's remorse. The Third Circuit concluded that a plaintiff lacked standing to sue L'Oreal for its failure to disclose that there were trace amounts of lead found in its lipstick in part because the plaintiff's subjective allegation that the trace amounts of lead in the lipstick are unacceptable to her did not constitute injury-in-fact."

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               Here is the key language, I believe.
               "Without evidence that a product was illegal to
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     sell" -- that doesn't apply here -- "harmful, or overpriced, a
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     plaintiff does not suffer injury from purchasing a product and
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     later wishing that he or she had not done so."
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               And she goes on and finds that the plaintiffs were
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     unable to put forward reliable evidence to prove that
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     ranitidine was unsafe.
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               So I don't -- I don't see a significant distinction
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     here; I just simply don't.
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               MR. SLATER: Your Honor, my response is this:
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     of all, I'm told -- I'm asking my team for the cite.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               MR. SLATER: That she was reversed on standing by the
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     Eleventh Circuit, so we'll have to see if that's correct.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MR. SLATER: I'm telling you this is what I'm
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     hearing, but I'm asking my team to find the citation to the
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     case from the Eleventh Circuit.
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               Number two, that -- she said if it was illegal to
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     sell, it was illegal to sell it.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It's illegal to sell lead in
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     lipstick.
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               MR. SLATER: Ah.
                                 No. But there's not genotoxic
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     carcinogen guidelines that were applicable that during the time
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this was sold -- see, we're not relying on the FDA limits that
came after the fact, because we're relying on the fact that
when this was being sold, none of the NDMA or NDEA was allowed,
zero was allowed unless they actually have identified it,
evaluated it and controlled for it and then went to the FDA and
said, look, this is how much is in here, we think it's safe,
we've done the risk assessment, let us sell it up to this
level.
          During the time it was sold, none of that happened,
and during that time zero was allowed. And you're not going to
hear anybody say to the contrary in -- I mean, I guess anyone
can say whatever they want, but that was the law. And the law
said you couldn't sell it. So, A, it was illegal to sell.
          The unacceptable risk was an unacceptable health
risk. We can talk about the general causation issue. I would
hope that our brief on Dr. Chodosh was compelling because he
made the argument more eloquently than I can ever --
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. It raised more questions than
answers, quite frankly, it did.
          MR. SLATER: Well, it raises --
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Was the case reversed on appeal?
That's not what I believe it was. I don't believe -- I don't
think that it --
                       I'm waiting to be told, but --
          MR. SLATER:
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't think it was.
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               MR. SLATER: So it was illegal to sell it. We have
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     that. And we don't rely on the later standards. And, by the
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     way, the later standards it still exceeded those levels that
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     came in in 2018 when the FDA --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: When you say it was illegal to
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     sell --
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                            The FDA does not allow you to sell a
               MR. SLATER:
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     drug that's not in the approved form.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I think we're talking in circles.
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     Can I hear from your adversaries? Because I don't want to have
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     you do all the...
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               MR. OSTFELD: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               Your Honor, I think you asked a very salient question
     at the beginning, which is the distinction between a
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     worthlessness theory, one word, and a worth-less theory, two
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     words.
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               I think the challenge here is plaintiffs are very
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     clearly asserting a worthlessness theory.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: One word?
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               MR. OSTFELD: One word. And they have no evidence of
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     a worth-less theory. And that's not inherently disqualifying.
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     It's possible to have a worthlessness theory, one word, that
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     comports with the "benefit of the bargain" measure of damages.
     But --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: How? But how do you get -- how
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without going to the issue of causation?

MR. OSTFELD: With admissible evidence which does have to go to the issue of causation, and it has to go to the issue of efficacy. You have to show the value as received.

I think the parties, with all the case law we've put out there, I actually don't think there's that much distance between our respective cases on the question of what "benefit of the bargain" means. It means the difference between the value as warranted and the value as received.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. And so but -- and I agree with that, but it seems to me that the only thing that's left is for the plaintiff to argue it should never have been sold, therefore, there's zero value. And that's argument to me.

MR. OSTFELD: I agree, Your Honor. And I think you've put your finger on the exact problem here. They're not positing admissible evidence of the value as received. What they are positing is an argument of the value as if it should never have been sold.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that's not evidence.

MR. OSTFELD: That is not evidence. And, that is, the essence of Professor Conti's approach, which you have excluded, is essentially a policy argument and a moral argument that it should be deemed valueless, because if we knew then what we know now, it would not have been sold or could not have been sold. But that's not evidence of the value received.

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In the real world, as Mr. Slater indicated, value was
received. Patients received effective hypertension medication.
They took it for years. They received the antihypertensive
benefits. The third-party payor plaintiffs received the
benefit of their members receiving effective hypertension
medication.
          So that, I think, is the problem. There isn't
admissible evidence on the worthlessness -- one word -- theory.
          So what I think Mr. Slater is postulating as a backup
is, okay, we let the jury decide. The defendants will come in
and put in their evidence that the product was efficacious.
still doesn't want general causation to come in. As
Ms. Lockard will discuss, if you come to the general causation
issue, we think it has to come in because you have to get into
whether the product was safe or not.
          I'm sorry.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Just wait one second because I'm
too distracted.
         MR. OSTFELD: Okay. Meanwhile, Your Honor, I did --
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Go ahead. I'll let you talk,
confer.
         MR. SLATER:
                      I'm sorry, Judge.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's okay. If you want to
confer, go ahead; I just can't --
         MR. SLATER:
                      No, no. We won't do that again.
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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's okay. I'm just -- I'm hard of hearing, so no worries.
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 $$\operatorname{MR.\ SLATER:}\ I$$ apologize. I have the same issue. Sorry.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. Mr. Ostfeld, go ahead.

MR. OSTFELD: So apologies, Your Honor. So where we are is we have a case that the product was efficacious. We have a case that the product was not dangerous, notwithstanding the presence of NDMA impurities.

Plaintiffs would have their own general causation evidence. There would certainly be a dispute to put in front of the jury as to whether or not the NDMA impurity made valsartan dangerous. I'm not aware of any evidence on the plaintiffs' side that it was not efficacious.

So, regardless, what plaintiffs don't have is admissible testimony on damages. And I think you drew a very critical distinction between liability and damages. If --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, and that was going to be my question, then aren't we in summary judgment land? Because if it's just strictly argument, shouldn't have been sold, zero value, that's strictly argument.

And that's the -- you know, I remember when I first was assigned to this case, and I posited the question to you all, I don't know -- I don't know of anyone on this side of the room that would stand up before the jury and say, yeah, it

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should have been sold knowing what we know now. I don't -- I
can't imagine that they would be making that argument to the
jury. The fight is going to be when did they know it, et
cetera, et cetera, and that's the fight.
          But I can't imagine the defendants standing before
the jury and saying, yeah, don't pay attention to what
Mr. Slater just told you because it was fine that we sold it
knowing what we know now. That's just not going to happen.
          And so, I mean, so that's why it shows to me that
this is strictly argument, ladies and gentlemen, let's just
pretend that we are living a different case and you go back and
you decide and you give -- you give the drug zero value because
it should never have been sold, when for years it did what it
was supposed to do. And then it just raises the question of,
well, why shouldn't it have been sold? Well, it shouldn't have
been sold because there's this thing called -- which we really
can't tell you -- carcinogen.
          And then they, the defendants, can't come forward and
say, well, don't worry about this carcinogen because it's not
really what you think it is.
          I mean, it just -- the whole causation thing is
another problem.
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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But let Mr. Ostfeld finish first.

Well --

MR. OSTFELD: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. SLATER:

And I think you've also hit on an important differentiation between what's going on in the Eleventh Circuit with the *Debernardis* case, as well as the ongoing appeals of the *Zantac* standing order. We're not at the standing stage here. We're not at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

And the concurrence in the *Debernardis* case, Judge Sutton's concurrence is very compelling and very significant on this point, because Judge Sutton draws that exact distinction. He says, "Saying that an allegation is sufficient to cross the very low threshold for Article III standing is not the same thing as saying even that you have liability, much less proving up damages."

And he specifically drew the differentiator between sufficient injury to plead standing and sufficient injury to prove up damages at trial. And he said — and in his case he was talking about the summary judgment stage, at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiffs are going to have to come forward with evidence to show why it was worthless and how it was worthless.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And from what I can gather from the record here, I think if I, you know, were to assess what Judge Kugler was thinking at the time, this was at the motion-to-dismiss stage. And so at summary judgment stage, what he ruled was the plaintiffs will have to come forward and show through admissible evidence that it had zero value.

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And saying it had zero value because it should never
have been sold is strictly -- it's just argument revising
         That's where I keep coming around. So I just don't
history.
know how -- and that's what -- that's the problem I had with
Conti.
          Conti was rendering an expert opinion about something
that I thought was very common sense, yeah, drugs that
shouldn't have been sold have no value. But that's because if
there's a recall, you shouldn't sell them and you should get no
value for them. They have no value if you're selling them.
And that was, I think, the Blue Cross Blue Shield case.
plaintiffs are disagreeing with my analysis of that. But --
          MS. ALLON: Your Honor, could I just add one thing
before we go back to the -- or are you --
          MR. OSTFELD: Please.
          MS. ALLON: Before we go to the plaintiffs, just
about Judge Rosenberg, since I represent GSK in that case, she
has not been reversed, just so we're clear.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Is it on appeal?
          MS. ALLON: Yes.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But it may never get -- didn't
they just settle yesterday?
          MS. ALLON: They settled the state cases.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                            Oh.
          MS. ALLON: But not the MDL. And so that decision,
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along with her 280-page decision finding that NDMA does not, in fact, cause cancer, are up on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing is not even completed.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Oh.

MS. ALLON: So there's been no reversal. And we don't expect there to be a reversal.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. I didn't -- I thought for sure that it was still good law. But, okay, thank you.

MR. OSTFELD: Your Honor, I guess the final point that I would like to make goes to Professor Conti. I agree with Your Honor. I think what Professor Conti did, essentially, was assign herself a regulator's role and say not here is the value of these drugs as received, as received they

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. And that's how I -- that's how her testimony was. And I said, well, that's just -- those facts do not fit my case.

now, they would not have been sold or could not have been sold.

were worthless, she says we should treat them as worthless,

because in an alternative reality, knowing then what we know

MR. OSTFELD: So I do think the exclusion of Professor Conti's opinion on that point does move us at least closer to summary judgment territory. Certainly I can envision a world where at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case we bring a directed verdict because there is not evidence to put in front of the jury on the quantification of plaintiffs' damages. I

don't want to predict what their case will be.

I will say as I stand here today, I do not know what their evidence is that demonstrates that the product is worth less, two words. They only had the worthless theory, and it was only due to Professor Conti's excluded opinion. So I do think this presents a challenge for plaintiffs at trial, but I don't want to speak for what their evidence would be.

Your Honor, just to kind of lay the framework for the other issues that Your Honor noted in your letter, Ms. Lockard will be covering adulteration and general causation. Ms. Allon will be covering the alternative drugs analysis, the Motion in Limine 16. I'm here to speak to you about worthlessness and the benefit-of-the-bargain theory. Unless you have other questions for me, I think I've concluded what I wanted to say on --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, is it your position that as to the -- well, "worthless" was Conti. But even if there were a claim for worth less, two words, there's no evidence that the plaintiffs have introduced?

MR. OSTFELD: So, Your Honor, it is our position that there is no evidence — there is no damages evidence on worth less. I think they could put in evidence that on — there could be a clash on general cause if that were brought in as part of the worth less inquiry. But they do not have a witness who has "value," the diminution in value.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What do you mean by "general cause"?

MR. OSTFELD: So let me pose my own hypothetical if it doesn't offend Your Honor.

In a world where plaintiffs had presented the type of damages that courts accept on a worth less, two words, frame, the analysis would be, the value as received was less than the value as warranted because the safety characteristics were this much less safe, or the efficacy characteristics were this much less efficacious and, therefore, based on a -- perhaps a survey design or some other study, we have determined that consumers would pay X dollars less for the product.

So general cause certainly becomes part of the analysis there because you have to know how much less safe the product is.

I think they could put on a case on they believe the product is less safe. We believe the product is not less safe. There could be a clash on that. I'm not aware of any clash on efficacy. But what's missing from their case, they do not have anybody who can say, therefore, the product is worth X dollars less.

The jury can't just be put out in the wilderness and told you've heard the evidence on safety, you've heard the evidence on efficacy, now you go figure out what it was worth.

There has to be testimony, admissible evidence from an expert

that tells them, gives them the ability to quantify damages under the two-word "worth less" scenario. And it doesn't exist in this case because plaintiffs made a strategic decision to go all in on worthlessness, one word.

MS. ALLON: Right. I was just going to say, I think Mr. Ostfeld got there. There's nothing to go to a jury on that point, because Dr. Conti did one damage calculation, which is full refund. And so if the plaintiffs are going to change their theory of damages to diminution in value, there is nothing to try in front of this jury. There is no evidence that they have as to what their damages are in a diminution—in—value theory. Dr. Conti didn't do it, and they have no other expert to do it.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, she tried to do it, but I -- MS. ALLON: No. She just did the full value. She did worthless, not worth less.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But she's not a biologist. She wouldn't have been qualified to do that anyway.

MS. ALLON: Well, they would have had to have a survey expert, and then she would have calculated — my point is, there's no damages numbers to put before a jury. So were we here on summary judgment on diminution of value, worth less, we would have to prevail because there is no evidence from the plaintiffs in the record as to what their damages are under that theory. We don't have to wait for a directed verdict.

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     There's no evidence. There's nothing to put in front of a jury
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     because they don't -- aren't pursuing that theory.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Ms. Lockard, did you want
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     to say something? Or Ms. Davidson, I'm sorry. No?
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               MS. DAVIDSON: No. I think everything was said.
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               MR. SLATER: Okay. I want to take a little bit of a
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     step back to what's happening now.
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               We've been proceeding based on the rulings that have
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     been made in this case for five years. And Judge Kugler ruled
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     on the decisions that got us here. On the motion to dismiss he
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     actually ruled there is no value when you sell an adulterated
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     drug. I understand that was the motion to dismiss. On the
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     summary judgment motions, he denied our motion, and both sides'
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     motions. And he said the value is somewhere between zero and a
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     hundred percent, and that's going to be for the jury to decide.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Based on admissible evidence,
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     that's true.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            So --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Based on admissible evidence, not
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     argument. That's true.
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               MR. SLATER: And he ruled that we had evidence that
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     was sufficient to go to the jury on that question.
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               So to now say we're going to change the rules on the
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     two-yard line or something and say, well, now -- I suppose Your
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     Honor could rule, look, I'm not going to let you say no value,
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and you're going to have to say that it's less value, and we would not be happy about that, we would preserve our rights, but we would have to try the case under that basis.

How would we prove it? We would put in the same evidence that we already were going to put in. We would put in this is what was paid. If you find no -- if you found no value, it would be this. But the Court has told you, you have to find some value, so you can use these numbers, and you can listen to what the defense said.

Remember, they have an unquantified value argument on the defense side. They have Dr. Stiroh who says, well, there is value because I'm relying on the people who say there was efficacy, but I never calculated what it was and I don't have a number for that. So she doesn't give any guidance to the jury on that at all.

But the jury then looks at this and says, okay, this is what was paid, this is what the plaintiffs say, this is what the defense says, and the jury says we're going to -- and they decide where they think in reason, based on the instructions of how value is established, what the value was. That -- if Your Honor wants to --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Tell me the evidence the jury is going to look at to determine value.

MR. SLATER: They're going to hear all the evidence on our side of the fact that at the cash register --

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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               MR. SLATER: -- on the warranty claim, there was
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     no -- that you were not allowed to sell this, and it was
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     illegal to sell.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: They're not going to hear that.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Well, Judge --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm not going to permit that.
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     That's argument.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            It's not. It's the law.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That is argument.
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               MR. SLATER: The law is that it was illegal to sell
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     these products.
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               And these -- you know, it's amazing that we're on the
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     defensive with these lawyers on the defense side putting us on
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     the defensive when these companies sold blood pressure pills
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     contaminated with genotoxins, and we're sitting here having to
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     explain why we should be allowed to recover in a warranty
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     case --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Because --
               MR. SLATER: -- where their own witnesses admit that
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     at the cash register if they hadn't represented it was
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     valsartan, falsely represented, it was valsartan USP, that was
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     a false representation, they could never have sold it. And
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     there's not one person in this room that's going to stand up
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     and say, yeah, we could have sold it.
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And Your Honor asked, are they arguing it was okay to sell it; nobody on the defense side is going to say it. That's exactly what they want to argue. They want to say put aside that the FDA found the risk was unacceptable and every pill that was out there that people were ready to sell or take — that were ready to sell had to be recalled, and nothing else was ever sold after that moment when the FDA found out. They put it in place, nobody could sell it. They want to relitigate that. Your Honor ruled in July they could not relitigate the FDA findings. And they now want to say don't worry about what the FDA said. The risk really wasn't bad and it shouldn't have been found unacceptable because it didn't hurt anybody.

And, by the way, let's just parenthetically put aside the fact that there's been three studies done on valsartan pills taken by people based on large insurance databases. The Gomm study, the most recent study they came up with both found increased risk of liver cancer statistically significant.

And the last study that they were arguing about to Your Honor, they haven't mentioned it in a while, also found melanoma.

The Pottegard study, we have all sorts of arguments about why it didn't get to statistical significance, very compelling.

So they're standing here acting like there's no evidence it caused cancer. The only studies actually done on

valsartan pills found it causes cancer in people, liver cancer, in two of the three studies. So --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that's the elephant in the room you don't want the jury to hear about.

MR. SLATER: I don't know. I -- we filed a brief to Your Honor. I'm starting to get a little exercise. I drank coffee. No, I didn't actually. I'm joking.

What the defense wants to do is they want to say -- I lost my train of thought trying to be funny. I'm sorry.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, it's the elephant in the room.

MR. SLATER: Oh, I know where, okay. So we've submitted to Your Honor the way that courts deal with situations like this, with an instruction. That instruction that we've submitted hits the issue head on and tells the jury what they're to consider and what they're not to consider.

The fact that there's an unreasonable carcinogenic risk is a matter of fact and a matter of law. This is evidence. It's not argument. It's the evidence and the facts in the real world. And the defense wants to argue, well, you know what, let's put that aside and let's put on Dr. Chodosh who parenthetically said I'm not an expert on regulatory standards, which are protective and more conservative to protect the safety of people. I didn't even analyze that. I analyzed biological causation of cancer, which is not an issue

in an economic loss case.

So they want to bring in an expert who admitted I don't fit that case at all, I'm not qualified and I didn't even evaluate that question. And they want to bring him in to say well, you know what, the risk wasn't really that bad. Nobody's actually going to get cancer from this. So putting that — it's not an elephant in the room. It would be putting a wild tiger in the room to start eating everybody. It doesn't belong.

And the easy way to deal with it, the way the courts do this every day, as Your Honor knows, is you give a limiting instructions. You say you're going to hear all sorts of words like "genotoxin," and you're going to hear about "probable human carcinogen," and you're going to hear all this language from the regulations, and that's the question. And those are the standards that applied to whether you could sell this drug because that's what NDMA and NDEA are.

What you're not deciding in this trial is whether those pills with those amounts actually caused cancer in anybody. Because the law and the facts are you weren't supposed to sell it with that stuff in at all. And the defense cannot dispute that. Nobody is going to dispute that. They want to dispute it through the back door of general causation where, as we pointed out in our brief, they already won a motion to say we're not allowed to bring in the fact that

there's a whole bunch of people that are claiming they got cancer from this and that we have strong evidence on. They kept out cancer causation already, but now they want it to come in also, so they want it both ways. We're not trying to have it both ways. We want to live in the world of this is the law, this is what they were allowed to do.

And at the cash register the fact that there was efficacy, we are able to say in opening statement, you know, the defense is going to tell you that at the cash register there was value because this was going to control blood pressure.

Well, in the real world, if they didn't represent that it was what it was supposed to be but actually told the truth and said, look, it's supposed to have five attributes, but the thing about safety, purity and quality, it doesn't have that, but it's still going to help you, what do you want to pay for it?

Judge Kugler already precluded the expert. I think it was Dr. Keller who wanted to say that, and that expert is not allowed to testify. So they tried to back-door in through Dr. Stiroh now. That's their argument. If Your Honor wants to let them make that argument, let the jury decide well, all right, you know what, we could say it had these two attributes, it had the right ingredients, for the most part, and it had the right strength to control blood pressure. It didn't have the

purity and the safety and the quality, and we're going to say all right, it had 60 percent — it had 40 percent of what it was supposed to have but not the other 60 percent, so they can value it based on that because that's what — if they're allowed to argue the efficacy, that's essentially on the warranty claim, which, again, is the only claim we're arguing about here, that is what the jury is going to decide, at the cash register what were the facts.

The facts were it had two out of the five things it was supposed to have. And the jury can put that together and decide, well, where is the value for it. Our expert says this is the full value and if you give a full refund, it would be this. If you didn't give a full refund, you figure out where it falls. And the jury makes that call, like they do in cases all the time where they decide how much does a person get for getting run over by a truck, for getting broken bones. And there's no guidance in New Jersey on how to value that, and juries do it every single day. There's nothing that's so esoteric about this that a jury can't decide it.

So, again -- I'm sorry, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: How do you get to zero value?

MR. SLATER: Well, I was actually arguing in the sense that, I could repeat it again, that if Your Honor says I am not going to let you -- I thought you were going to -- you've decided there's no way I'm letting you argue zero value,

so --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: How do you get to zero value?

MR. SLATER: How do we get there?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

MR. SLATER: We say at the cash register, you're not allowed as a matter of law, this is the evidence, this is the law, to sell because it's got three -- it's got two out of the five attributes. You can't do it. If it doesn't have all five attributes, it's illegal to sell it because it's not the approved form the FDA lets you sell. And, therefore, and we obviously talk about why that happens and that their witnesses admit that they could not sell it. They were not supposed to sell it.

And then they argue, well, you know, there was efficacy so even though it slipped through, they got some value. But that's for the jury to decide at worst.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But then you have to come forward and say it had zero value, not simply because it had a contaminant, but because it had zero value, it didn't do what it said it was supposed to do, addressing those five factors that you want to talk about.

You can argue that it had a fundamental defect, it didn't lower blood pressure, maybe it did, maybe it didn't.

But the fact that it caused cancer was, you know, overrode everything and, therefore, it has zero value. That's how the

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     "benefit of the bargain" goes. We've got to make sure that
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     we're talking about liability versus damages.
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               But this is how -- I keep going back to it, the
     plaintiffs want to stand up and say, ladies and gentlemen of
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     the jury, here's my case, here's our case. It turns out that
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     when we paid for these drugs at the counter they had
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     contaminants in them.
                            They weren't supposed to have
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     contaminants in them. It was illegal to have contaminants in
     them, give us a full refund, sit down. The trial will take
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     five minutes, sit down.
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               MR. SLATER: And --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's not --
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               MR. SLATER: But that's not --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's --
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               MR. SLATER: We're not going to be that simple
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     though, Judge. And we're not --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But that's your case.
                                                         No.
                                                              But
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     that's your case in a nutshell. And --
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               MR. SLATER: But it's not, it's not, because you left
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     out a very important part of our argument. And your
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     hypotheticals were like what if it was some kind of
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     nonmaterial -- there could be cGMP violations, the label was
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     smudged. There's a million examples you can come up with.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
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               MR. SLATER: But we're not walking in and saying, you
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know, the law actually says that if there were rampant cGMP violations in the facility, every pill, every drug that goes out of there is technically contaminated, is technically adulterated. We're not arguing that. We're not going for some de minimis technical win. We're not just saying because it was contaminated.

We're saying because it was contaminated with genotoxic impurities that are in the cohort of concern, that were barred from being in these drugs, and it was not manufactured, A, in conformance with cGMPs, which is one independent basis to establish adulteration, and, two, did not meet the compendial specifications that they represented it did which is a second basis for adulteration, both of which we are arguing and both of which we have evidence for, and our expert will address and explain, because it was such a significant —because the contamination was so significant in terms of what it's rated as and what its potential impact was, its risk, because of that significance, and that's where we think the materiality prong goes in.

And Judge Kugler had the same concern. You got to show that it matters. But in a regulatory case, as Dr. Chodosh testified under oath, it's the risk level from a regulatory standpoint, which is protective and conservative towards safety, and that's why we're saying it didn't have value, because what they said was not true and you could not legally

sell it.

Those pills were not legally sold. They were sold and it slipped through, but that doesn't give them the excuse to say, well, no harm, no foul, we did it, and it helped.

They're going to argue, well, you know what, it turns out, ladies and gentlemen, yeah, we probably shouldn't have sold it, we figured it out eventually, but it did help them, so they should get some value. Their expert is going to be allowed to say that. Your Honor's letting Dr. Stiroh say it. She has no methodology to value the efficacy. So we're in the position, I think, of looking at what are the attributes of the pill. What are the things that you have to have in order to get approved to meet the USP criteria, and the jury decides it.

General causation does not belong because that's not a factor at all.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't know. I sit here, because when I was first assigned the case, I recall reading the parties' submissions. And one of the concerns that I had, as I read what the defendants had written, that proceeding in this fashion was novel. The way that Judge Kugler had decided to proceed was novel; that this Court would create reversible error if it did proceed in this way. I considered it all. I saw the wisdom in it at the time. But what has happened since then is despite my efforts to drill down, drill down and talk about evidence, I keep getting argument.

Now, what you've just said to me, Mr. Slater, says to me -- you say things like the jury's going to hear that it had a genotoxic contaminant; that it was unsafe; that the plaintiff has to show that that matters, that all says to me what the defendants have been quarreling about, which is how can they try this case without causation.

And I get right back to it and I don't know. I don't know how the plaintiff can stand up before — and I know you folks have been arguing about, you know, the depositions and these really ugly words that are being used, and I don't know how the plaintiffs can get up and say all of these really — genotoxic and mutants and really, really scary words without addressing the elephant in the room. And that is, well, are we talking about, you know, a little speck of flour in these things or are we talking about cancer that kills?

And I don't know how the plaintiffs walk that fine line. I've remained concerned about it under 403 for a long time. I just don't see how the case can be tried without causation, I don't; I just simply don't.

MR. SLATER: The --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You have tried to persuade me. I keep coming back and saying why would I try a five-week trial, a four-week trial knowing that it's coming back. And I'm not going to try a four- or five-week trial if I don't have the comfort that I am -- that this is -- that I'm comporting -- I

think I'm comporting with the rules of evidence and I'm comporting with the law. I just -- I think it's -- there's two problems, maybe three.

It's argument versus evidence. It's liability versus damages. There's a lot of conflating going forward.

There's — now the other issue is, are we talking about it has zero value because it's like a sugar pill or are we talking about it's a fundamental defect because it is a genotoxic contaminant? And if that's the case and it causes cancer, then we should get a full refund. Or are we talking about it's a sugar pill and we should get a full refund because it's completely inefficacious? Or is the jury going to weigh both of those and say, well, there was a therapeutic value, the chance of getting cancer was so nil and the FDA said sell it anyway even after the recall. So that is where I think the robust discussion in the jury box is going to happen, which is what is the value.

Plaintiffs keep wanting to come back and saying it should never have been sold, period, it was illegal to sell it, we get our full refund. And then we get into another argument that I haven't even gotten to, which is the defendants' argument, which is, well, if they're going to make that argument, they don't just get a free ride here, particularly in the absence of fraud, because we didn't know it contained nitrosamine.

And that appeals to me, because I think if the jury finds that they didn't know, I mean, does that mean that the plaintiffs get a full windfall?

These are all questions that, you know, what, three weeks before trial continue to swirl around, and I still don't have clarity on. I'm not going to try a case unless I have clarity on it. And siting here today, as you can tell, I don't have clarity; I just don't.

And part of the problem is I think the motion to dismiss was somewhat far broader than the motion for summary judgment. I think there were -- I think perhaps there -- you know, I can reconcile those two documents because of the pleadings stage. One was a pleadings stage and one was summary judgment stage. But -- I don't know.

MR. SLATER: You know, Judge, it's interesting because you haven't heard from the defense where they've actually pointed to the law or what actually happened here in terms of the warranty claim, in terms of the fact that these shouldn't have been sold, where they haven't — they've never pointed to you and said, well, you know, the FDA or the law in general says that if it actually caused cancer, that's a touchstone to whether the drugs could or could not be sold because that's not the law. The law —

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, they -- I don't -- what -- they are not disputing that once the contaminant -- we have to

deal in what the facts are.

facts are.

MR. SLATER: That's what -
CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Their evidence, presumably,

they're going to -- well, if they're going to put in evidence

that, you know, yeah, we knew from day one it contained this

and we sold it anyway, well, then that's their issue, and I'm

sure you're happy about it.

But they're not -- the evidence is going to be, I

presume, that at the time that they found that it contained the

contaminant, they advised the FDA and the FDA issued the

Plaintiff is going to come forward and say, well, no, it was adulterated from day one because this is what the evidence shows; that given the process that they used, it produced this contaminant from day one, and we should get -- we should get our money back, not because it was illegal to sell, but because it was not the "benefit of the bargain." It was more harm than it was efficacious, number one.

That's why I'm saying we have to deal in what the

And number two, you know, dealing with the fraud, well, we get a full refund plus some because they knew and they hid it from the FDA. But we're not even dealing with the fraud. We keep focusing on the express warranty.

MR. SLATER: Well, the --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I feel like I keep talking in

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     circles up here; I really do.
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               MR. SLATER: Well, when you talk about why we are
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     entitled to recover, you asked why are you entitled, why are
     you entitled to recover, it's a breach of warranty claim.
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     reasons that they breached the warranty matter.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Exactly. You keep saying that.
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     And that's why causation matters.
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               MR. SLATER: But there is no causation prong in a
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     warranty claim.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That --
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               MR. SLATER: It's not an element of the claim, Your
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     Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It's an element of damages.
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     Focus, liability. Focus on liability and then focus on
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     damages. Focus on the elements of showing a breach of
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     warranty. That goes to liability. Now we've got to deal with
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     damages.
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               Is it an element of liability? No.
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               MR. SLATER: Of course.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Is it an element of damages?
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               MR. SLATER:
                            The only causation, quote-unquote
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     causation for a warranty claim is did it -- if it didn't comply
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     with the warranty, you're entitled to get your money back.
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               To the extent that Your Honor -- and I know I've said
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     this before and I know I've just said it a few minutes ago --
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     to the extent the Court has a concern that you don't want some
     de minimis technical violation to be the basis for our
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     argument, we are not arguing that.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No; I know. I think you're
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     arguing -- I think you're arguing what is called a fundamental
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     defect in the product.
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               MR. SLATER: It clearly is a fundamental defect.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. And so that to me says what
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     makes it a fundamental defect, because it doesn't do what it's
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     supposed to do, it actually is more harmful than what it's
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     supposed to do. To me that sounds like causation.
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                            Well --
               MR. SLATER:
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: "Materiality," "fundamental,"
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     those are all words that to me say causation. They all say to
     me -- I now see the wisdom of what the defendants are saying to
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     me why maybe perhaps personal injury cases are tried first,
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     because they make more sense.
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               MR. SLATER: Can I ask a question, Judge?
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               One option you have is to say to us, I'm letting
     causation in. I'm going to let the defendants argue that
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     there's no evidence that this could have ever caused cancer in
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     the amounts that was in there.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Uh-huh.
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               MR. SLATER: We wouldn't be happy about it. We'd
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have to add a bunch of testimony back into our designations,

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because we have devastating admissions from the witnesses; for example, admitting that the treatise they cited in their submissions to the FDA from the World Health Organization says it's likely to cause cancer in humans, for example. We took that out of our designations. We have a lot of evidence on that. We bring in our -- one of our experts or two of our experts to -- and honestly, Your Honor, I don't think you've already -- if you were to let it in, I assume it wouldn't be a full-blown causation trial. They'd have Dr. Chodosh. We'd bring an expert in. I'm previewing it for the defense. I don't know how they get around the only studies that have ever been done on the pills that show it actually does have a significant -- an increased risk of cancer that's statistically significant. So I guess Your Honor could say, look, if we're going to trial, I'm going to let them argue causation. We put quardrails around it. We put our evidence back in. We won't be happy about it. The case is going to take longer because there's going to be more witnesses and more testimony, but we'll have to deal with that. And there's no way that we --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that is your worth less, two words, case.

and there's nothing that we can do about that. And --

MR. SLATER: Well, I think it's our no worth or our worth less case because in that case we're going to be

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     allowed --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It could be.
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               MR. SLATER: Because remember, they blocked us from
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     proving it causes cancer. That was their in-limine motion to
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     block us. So now that in-limine motion, you'd have to change
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     your ruling, because obviously you'd have to vacate it because
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     they've changed their position, and then we would put in
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     evidence that it does cause cancer, and then all this would
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     come in. And now, you know what, maybe it's better for us on
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     appeal if they do that.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No.
                                       I think --
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Because --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: To be fair, I think that the
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     confusion came from a ruling from Judge Kugler that causation
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     was not to be a part of this trial. And so that's my
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     recollection, though someone will correct me if I'm wrong.
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     as a result, there was a motion that since it wasn't going to
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     be part of this trial, that it needed to be kept out by the
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     plaintiffs. And based upon that, with those parameters, I
     ruled that. But as I've said, I've gone back and forth and
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     back and forth. And I don't know how it doesn't become part of
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     this trial.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            I don't --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Does anyone agree with me on this
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     side?
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MR. SLATER: I don't think that's correct, Your

Honor, because they also in the motions, the same motions, they

argue general causation is a part of the case. Remember -
CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: A part of the case.

MR. SLATER: Yeah. They wanted general — we briefed the in-limine motions. One of their motions was we should not be allowed to tell the jury that this caused cancer in people, we shouldn't be able to argue it, suggest it, or anything else. They also argued general causation should come in, and we argued it shouldn't. And that was an issue that Your Honor addressed on July 23rd.

So I think that, really, what I'm saying to you is if that's the only way we're going to try the warranty claim, because, again, I don't think it's an issue with the other two claims. The other two claims are it was deceptive conduct and outright fraud. Those two claims are different because that's where we're actually saying you actively deceived. The warranty claim is the warranty — there's an element of deception in that, but the warranty claim is you said it was this; it wasn't. And you said it has to matter, though. I'm paraphrasing. And we agree with that. It has to matter. And that's materiality under the regulatory law that applies here.

Dr. Chodosh said exactly the same thing Judge Kugler said. He said it's two different standards. We're not applying biological causation in this case because that's not

what the law is. That's not the reason they pulled this off the market. No one ever studied this to say in these amounts, in these pills it causes cancer so that's why there's a recall. No. It's because they're genotoxic probable human carcinogens that have been looked at for many, many years. There's regulations going back to the early 2000s and before, but certainly by 2008 the FDA said you can't have these in the drugs. These are very dangerous substances. It can't be in there. And if you want to have it in there, you have to analyze it up front, you have to come to us and we'll make a decision. And they never did that so it wasn't allowed.

So the causation is not part of this case as a matter of law and as a matter of fact because it was never looked at.

When you look at why these drugs were pulled off the market,

Judge, that's just what it is, though. The reason the drugs were pulled off the market is because it had NDMA in it, not because the FDA found it's going to cause cancer.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No; I know that.

MR. SLATER: And, by the way, they eventually did do an analysis and said we think 1 in 8,000 people would have an increased risk of cancer, and they did these analyses and they did their whatever. But they said, yes, more people are going to — because people are going to get cancer.

But, you know, if the answer is, I'm not letting you try the warranty claim without the causation, then we have to

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live with that. And maybe that's good for us, because then we
don't have to worry about it being tried without it. They have
nothing to argue about on appeal. And then maybe it helps the
Court to feel more comfortable.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: All right. Let me just hear from
them.
          And the other thing, I just want to say it while it's
on top-of-mind, which is I think it's incorrect to say to the
jury that it's illegal -- it was illegal for the defendants to
sell these drugs in 2012, because illegal says that they
violated the law.
          It is true that as a matter of law adulterated drugs
can't be sold, that is true.
          MR. SLATER: So we say it that way.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, yeah, but words matter.
          MR. SLATER:
                      They matter. But here's the problem:
think one of the big things the Court might be wrestling with
in the abstract --
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What I'm wrestling with is that
the plaintiffs just keep making arguments and not backing it up
with evidence. And I'm very frustrated by it. Can you see?
          MR. SLATER:
                      The evidence is that the condition of
these pills, based on how they were manufactured and what ended
up in them, violated the specifications, violated cGMPs,
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rendered them contaminated, et cetera. And as a matter of law,

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     because we argue that they met the statutory definition -- this
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     is not argument, this is evidence. Our experts are going to
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     say it met the statutory definition of adulteration.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: They are not -- they are not
     permitted to be sold. But unless and until you prove that they
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     knew what they were selling was contaminated, it is not proper
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     argument to say that they illegally sold them.
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               MR. SLATER: But it's not an element of the claim,
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             I mean, I get that you --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But it's a 403 issue.
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               MR. SLATER: We're going to now create more hurdles
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     for us to get over --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. You've got to --
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               MR. SLATER: -- on a claim where knowledge is not an
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     element of an express warranty claim. It's an element of --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm talking --
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               MR. SLATER: -- the fraud claim, but it is not an
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     element of this claim. I'm sorry, Judge. I don't mean to
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     interrupt you.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm talking about how -- the
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     arguments that you're presenting to the jury. You've got to be
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     very careful.
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               I mean, you've just got to be very careful and
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     precise on what your arguments are.
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               Let me hear from Ms. Lockard.
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1 MS. LOCKARD: Thank you. Thank you, Judge. 2 been listening very patiently for my opportunity. 3 Just to clarify a couple of points that Your Honor 4 has picked up on. We absolutely disagree with the contention 5 that we think we did anything illegal in selling these drugs. 6 The FDA itself, if you want to talk about evidence, 7 we have a statement from the FDA that explains it, which 8 basically says from Commissioner Gottlieb at the FDA that it 9 needs to be recognized that there is a risk of an impurity 10 occurring to know that it should be tested for. Before we 11 undertook this analysis, meaning FDA, neither regulators nor 12 industry fully understood how the nitrosamines could form 13 during the manufacturing process. That's evidence. That's 14 from the FDA. That will come in. 15 So --16 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. And then they'll respond 17 with the warning letter and then your expert's admission. 18 mean, I understand that's the back and forth. 19 MS. LOCKARD: Correct. 20 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that's a jury question. 21 MS. LOCKARD: So then we'll fight about whether there 22 was a cGMP violation, whether the products were adulterated. 23 Both sides have their position on that. 24 The issue, though, is on the general causation -- and

by the way, the motion in limine that Mr. Slater is referring

to, it's Motion in Limine No. 10 by the defendants. And it was to exclude evidence or reference to individuals, individuals, who used valsartan and developed cancer. So we didn't want them to come in and say, oh, we've got all these other clients who are suing has cancer. That's what that motion was about. It wasn't about general causation.

So, you know, obviously our position is set forth in the papers. And as you recognize, Judge, you said it is the elephant in the room. And we agree we don't need to get into a full epidemiology trial and spend days talking about this. And the literature that Mr. Slater has referred to, we absolutely have responses to that, as to why it's not reliable, why it doesn't matter, why it doesn't prove that these drugs cause cancer. Dr. Chodosh can speak to that as well as other experts we have. We have epidemiology and toxicologists if we blow it up that much.

But the important thing is plaintiff wants to be able to come in and say, well, it was an unacceptable risk. That's what the FDA said. And that's the regulatory risk.

And Your Honor asked about the difference between biological risk and regulatory risk. The issue is that the FDA's obligation is to make sure there are safe drugs on the market. The way they do that is they want to ensure that the drugs that are being marketed are free from unreasonable risk.

So the FDA never undertook to determine if these

drugs caused cancer. They never did. At the time when all of this came to light, the FDA was acting very fast and furiously to get this resolved because there are, you know, millions of patients taking these drugs. And FDA, as you know,

Commissioner Gottlieb said this is a new issue. They sprang into action and they said we've got to do something. We've got to get some guidance, so we're going to come up with some sort of limits and standards that can be easily and quickly applied. And so what they did — and in our submission with, as we've described, Dr. Chodosh's testimony, the FDA came up with these limitations based on a linear low dose extrapolation from animal studies.

Now, that presumes that extremely low doses of the substance are potentially carcinogenic over the course of the lifetime, based on an assumption that they drew from studies where these massive amounts were given. And so all they did is they did a straight-line extrapolation and said, well, we know if this amount causes cancer in rats, you know, let's straight-line extrapolate it down to a limit that we can be assured is safe.

They didn't say anything below that level is unsafe or causes cancer. They just said, look, let's stop it here.

We know if we stop it here and we apply these limits that everything on the market will be free of unreasonable risk.

That raises the question, though, it's unanswered

through that, it's unanswered through the FDA levels as to whether what was actually on the market causes cancer.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, the concern I have is that once the jury hears that it's free from an unreasonable risk, it raises the question risk from what?

MS. LOCKARD: Exactly.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And now we're back to causation; that there is this potential that it could cause cancer, et cetera.

And I think to somehow water it down and argue to the jury that, well, the FDA determined that this poses an unacceptable risk when they recalled it and, therefore, on day one it posed an unacceptable risk, it still leaves open the question of risk from what?

MS. LOCKARD: And it has to be said, in the unacceptable — our position and our — this is our argument to the jury would be that it's an unacceptable risk to have the drug on the market. That's all the FDA was saying. It's an unacceptable risk, because we don't know at present what level would actually cause cancer, if any. But we know that if we keep it at this level and we let anything that's below this level on the market, we know it's safe. But safe from what? What is the risk?

So you have to be able to explain, well, we're talking about carcinogenicity. So the next question to the

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jury is, well, what is the real risk? You know, does anyone
get cancer? What do we -- nobody has presented that. And if
defense is not able to present the biological risk and the real
evidence from the scientists and the biologists and the cancer
researchers, the jury is left with concluding that oh, well,
defense must concede this; that the drugs that were on the
market did cause cancer. And that, we feel, that is the root
of the error in proceeding in this way.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so the breach of warranty is
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had
if they had been as warranted.
          And so to say to the jury that they had no value
because they posed an unacceptable risk deprives the jury of
knowing what that risk is and deprives the jury of any evidence
in determining what that value might be, because -- I -- I --
yeah.
          MR. SLATER:
                      Your Honor.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
          MR. SLATER: We don't want to deprive the jury of
evidence.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                            What?
          MR. SLATER: We don't want to -- I'm sorry. We don't
want to deprive the jury of evidence.
          We want to say exactly what defense counsel just
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conceded. It was an unacceptable risk to have the drug on the market. What was the unacceptable risk? It was unacceptable carcinogenic risk from a regulatory standpoint. And we've submitted to Your Honor a limiting instruction that explains to the jury exactly what that means, exactly what they will decide and what they won't decide.

They agree that having that NDMA in those pills was unacceptable and you can't sell it. That's the law that applies to this claim.

Now -- so we're not saying don't tell the jury what the risk is. We're going to put in the guidelines from ICH and the FDA. And their own -- ZHP had an internal standard operating procedure that went back to 2011 that said they had to identify every genotoxic carcinogen or genotoxic impurity because they knew that this was unacceptable. This is a regulatory safety issue, as counsel just argued. That's what Dr. Chodosh said.

I think a big part of the problem is, the facts and the law are very one-sided in this case. I mean, I think that — and I'm trying to be a psychologist here a little bit, because I think Judge Kugler had the same concern you have, which is this is so one-sided, how do they have a defense? And he said I'm going to let the jury decide some of these questions.

The law and the facts -- because the facts are so

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one-sided and so disturbing and because the law is so clear, it is a very, very one-sided case. And they're saying, well, let us argue things that don't apply in this context. Let us apply general causation. And you know what, Judge, we're saying, over our objection, if you say it has to come in, then let's try the case with general causation in it. We'll do it. not going to run away from it. We'll have to do it. And it may be great for us on appeal that if we had to try it, they have nothing to complain about. But we don't want to hide from the jury what's being tried. We don't want to hide what the They need to know that. That's why it mattered at the cash register because it wasn't a smudged label. It wasn't a piece of flour. It was something that was real and dangerous, and as they say, as counsel just argued, the FDA looked at this and said we're not analyzing whether it causes cancer in these amounts. This is something that we've known for many, many years. We can't have these impurities. They're a cohort of concern. They're very toxic.

I mean, we know what NDMA is used for. It's deliberately used to give cancer to lab animals. That's how it's used in the laboratory. It's a very dangerous substance.

If they really want to join this and counsel really wants to stand up and say, you know what, ladies and gentlemen, yeah, we shouldn't have sold it and we weren't supposed to sell it, I don't know, I guess you'd have to fashion some

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instruction to tell them why you're letting them argue general
causation. Maybe you say, well, this goes to damages but not
liability, because the liability didn't factor in general
causation, but however the Court would do it. And they argue
you know what, yeah, we sold this stuff and, yeah, we didn't
know it was there, but you know what, it turns out we've got
Dr. Chodosh who's going to tell you it doesn't cause cancer in
those amounts.
          You know what, maybe the jury after they hear our
evidence there says, you know what, how dare these people, how
dare they come in here after they've put this into our drug
supply and say, well, you know what, it's no harm, no foul
because it was too little to cause you cancer.
          You know what, maybe with punitive claims, maybe
that's the best thing they could ever argue for us. And we'll
live with it, Judge. I mean, at this point we just want to try
this case. I'm not agreeing that it would be the right
outcome, but reasonable minds can differ. And your mind is
much more important than my mind. So if that's what you rule,
then we'll try the case like that. We'll have no choice and
we'll do it.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me take a break. I'll be
back.
          THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
          (Recess was taken at 2:22 p.m. until 2:48 p.m.)
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               THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. You can have a seat.
               Where did we leave off? Somebody wanted to say
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     something to me.
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               MR. OSTFELD: Your Honor, there was just one point
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     that I wanted to raise that I neglected to raise during the
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     initial conversation about the diminished value, the worth
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     less, two words, theory, which is that Judge Kugler actually
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     dismissed that theory on standing grounds in his Motion to
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     Dismiss Opinion No. 2. It's document 728 at pages 11 and again
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     at page 13.
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               What he essentially says --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Wait. Let me get to it. Hang on.
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               MR. OSTFELD: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What page?
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               MR. OSTFELD: So it's at page 11 is kind of the
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     introduction to that, at the bottom of the first full
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     paragraph, and then the substantive discussion of it is on
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     page 13.
               Where Judge Kugler writes, the second theory of
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     economic loss, the receipt of a less valuable product would
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     have sufficed --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Wait.
                                         I'm sorry. I don't see it.
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               MR. OSTFELD: Oh, I'm so sorry, Your Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's all right. Motion to
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     dismiss opinion.
               MR. OSTFELD: Opinion No. 2, document 728.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Oh. Okay. I'm on the wrong
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     opinion.
               Hang on.
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               Well, maybe I don't have it. I have the 775 opinion.
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               MR. OSTFELD:
                            Okay.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me hear it.
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               MR. OSTFELD: Okay. So I'll read both sections,
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     then, Your Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MR. OSTFELD: Beginning on page 11 of document 728,
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     Judge Kugler first identified plaintiffs' three theories of
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     economic injury. He identified them. The first theory was
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     receipt of a worthless, one word, product because of the
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     failure to receive the "benefit of the bargain." The second
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     was receipt of a less valuable product because of the failure
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     to receive the "benefit of the bargain." The third was
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     economic loss from having to purchase replacement medication
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     due to the voluntary recalls.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MR. OSTFELD: What he found at the --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Wait. Hang on one second.
                                                              Let me
23
     just...
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               MR. OSTFELD:
                             I'm sorry.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me just read it.
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Okay.

MR. OSTFELD: All right. And he found the first and third theories satisfied standing. He found the second theory, the worth less, two word, theory, "fails to allege facts which would permit a fact finder to value the purported injury with" -- I think he meant without, but it says "with resorting to mere conjecture."

The analysis for that then comes on page 13. On the second full paragraph, Judge Kugler writes: "The second theory of economic loss, the receipt of a less valuable product would have sufficed to establish an injury in fact if plaintiffs had provided a theory for the fact finder to value it, but they do not. Instead, they would have the fact finder resort to mere conjecture to value their purported injury. This second theory is insufficient to confer standing."

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's the Zantac ruling.

MR. OSTFELD: That is the Zantac Opinion. And it applies equally here. And it also applies — of course, standing is reevaluated at each stage. And here we are at the trial stage, and it applies with equal force here.

Plaintiffs still do not have any evidence, economic survey, otherwise, that would allow the fact finder without resorting to mere conjecture to value the purported injury for diminution of value.

So we can certainly have a trial where general

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causation comes in, but it's binary. It's worthless, that's the theory they've gone all in on. If they can't prove that it's worthless, it doesn't go to the jury.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You have to -- you have to say that again because the record's not going to reflect what you -- you have to say one word and two words.

MR. OSTFELD: Okay. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

It's their theory, the plaintiffs have strategically gone all in on, one word, worthless as their theory of damages. That is the only evidence they were prepared to present to the jury through Professor Conti, and that opinion has been excluded.

So where we are now, they do not have economic damages evidence for their worthless, one word, theory. They have never had and do not have economic damages for their worth less, two words, theory, which was dismissed for lack of standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

So I think we're back to Your Honor's suggestion, which is this is now a summary judgment matter. There is no evidence to present on damages at trial. There is no evidence to take this to a jury. Therefore, I can make an oral motion, we can make a written motion, but we believe this case is now a summary judgment case.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You want to respond.

MR. SLATER: I didn't understand that Your Honor

actually ruled that we cannot put in the no-value theory, number one.

Number two, I'd have to look again at these rulings. I obviously have not looked at them in a long time. But we certainly believe, before even getting to that issue, and, again, I would want to look at the decision — and as counsel just said, standing gets reevaluated at various stages of the case. I've made arguments here as to how it would be valued, arguments that were never presented at that time because it was a much more flat record. We hadn't done the — we hadn't developed the case. So if the standing issue is now going to be challenged on worth less, then we would obviously be able to present arguments such as we made here today.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, no. I think the issue that Judge Kugler had from what's being presented is that the plaintiff alleged no facts to support a value worth less, two words, and so that claim was out.

And it reminds me of what Judge Rosenberg ruled: "In this MDL, the plaintiffs attempted, but were unable, to put forward reliable evidence to prove that ranitidine was unsafe, which now changes the Court's standing analysis."

It says, "During the motion-to-dismiss stage, the standing theory on which the plaintiffs relied for their economic loss claim had some similarities to *Debernardis* and *Aqua Dots* because the Court found that the plaintiffs plausibly

1 alleged that the drug was unsafe and should not have been sold." 2 3 It's a little different, because then the Court --4 because she did preclude the testimony under Daubert. 5 plaintiffs could no longer claim that the drug was unsafe or 6 should not have been sold because of its cancer-causing 7 propensity. 8 And I'm understanding from Judge Kugler's Opinion 9 that the complaint here -- the operative complaint here never 10 alleged that the drugs should never have been sold because of 11 its cancer-causing propensity. I don't know. 12 I mean, that's been a fundamental MR. SLATER: 13 allegation in the case all along that --14 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't know. From what was read 15 to me, of course I didn't have the Opinion in front of me. 16 In our case. I don't know --MR. SLATER: 17 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: The Judge seemed to find that you 18 were not making that allegation and, therefore, the claim was 19 out. 20 And, you know, as Mr. Ostfeld says, you made the 21 strategic choice to go, you know, all in with the worthless, 22 one word, theory. It shouldn't have been sold, therefore, 23 they're worthless. MR. SLATER: Well, I think if we're going to talk 24

about what Judge Kugler did, he said that it's a jury question

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about whether there was any value or not.

And I want to add something to what we talked about before, because you're asking what is the evidence.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's true. I mean, it does sound as if they're -- how can I put this? It does sound as if there's -- I'd have to look to see how I can reconcile the motion to dismiss with the summary judgment opinion.

Yes?

MR. SLATER: I think one of the other things that's important in terms of you're asking us what is our evidence about the value not being -- having no value, the evidence of no value.

One of the other things that's important to remember here is, unlike in Zantac where all Zantac was contaminated, in this case all valsartan and all sartans and all blood pressure pills were not contaminated, number one.

So if we look at the warranty claim, a person walks up to the cash register and now they're presented with, in their version of the case, which Your Honor's allowing them to argue, well, there was efficacy so there's value. So essentially the argument is, well, if a consumer had a choice they still would have paid less but they wouldn't have had to pay nothing, okay.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Uh-huh. Yes.

MR. SLATER: But that could never have happened. Our

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     evidence is, because we have the evidence, the TPP
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     representatives are going to testify that the way the formulary
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     works is the TPP cannot buy a drug that does not comply with
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     the compendium.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            So --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But they did.
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               MR. SLATER: But if they were told this is a drug
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     that has efficacy but doesn't have safety, quality, and purity,
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     it could not have been sold. So in terms of what the evidence
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     is about the value at the time of the register from the TPPs'
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     standpoint, they would not have paid anything for the pills
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     that were not in compliance because they can't. They're not
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     allowed to. They --
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. But --
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               MR. SLATER: And number two, the retailers have
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     confirmed they would not have sold it.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. But those aren't the
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     facts of the case.
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                            No; but it is the facts of the case.
               MR. SLATER:
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, they're not.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Because those are the rules that
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     applied.
               So under the warranty law, if we're going to value at
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     the register and we're going to value what the drug is worth
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     and they're going to say, well, there's going to be efficacy,
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it's okay that there was not going to be quality, purity, safety because the efficacy gives it value, the evidence is, well, what would the TPPs have paid for at that time.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.

MR. SLATER: So if they want to introduce that, and the TPPs, our evidence is going to be, wouldn't have paid for it. Their argument is, well, you know what, you did pay for it and you shouldn't get all your money back because it still helped your customers. And the jury makes the decision. And the jury makes the call on that. They decide what's the value. And, again --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I think it just -- this all highlights to me why it is that it's an impermissible argument to the jury, it seems to me, that a plaintiff can't just get up and say we get a full refund because they should never have sold it.

MR. SLATER: But we're not --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why? Because you have to, under the categories that Judge Rosenberg was talking about, you have to either allege that it was unsafe and, therefore, it had no value, that there was such a fundamental defect and, therefore, it had no value or, you know, you have to dispute that it had any therapeutic value.

It just seems incongruous to me that the third-party payors can recover under the plaintiffs' theory here, you know,

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millions of dollars or whatever it is that they're seeking and the personal injury plaintiffs may recover zero. That just seems so incongruous to me that it's hard for me to -- which is why I say to myself: Shouldn't causation be front and center here? And plaintiffs keep coming back and saying, well, they should never have sold them so we get a full refund, never should have sold them. But why shouldn't they have sold them? Yes, they were adulterated. Yes, they were non-cGMP compliant, plaintiffs will prove. But plaintiffs also have to prove that they had no value. They had no value either because they were sugar pills. They had no value because there was such a fundamental defect, they caused cancer. But to say that they had no value because they should never have sold them full stop is a betrayal of the record. The fundamental defect is the MR. SLATER: unacceptable risk that has been conceded from a regulatory standpoint. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that's causation. I see no --MR. SLATER: But it's material --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I see --MR. SLATER: Well, whatever you want to call it, we have the evidence to supply that. We have, among other things,

30(b)(6) witnesses of the companies. We have the FDA saying

we meet the statutory definitions. We have admissions from the

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this can't be sold, that it has to be recalled and pulled off the market. We have all of that evidence.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that's giving a value. That's giving a value to the jury which is the risk was so unacceptable. Call it a biological risk, whatever you want to call it. Because for me I understand there's a distinction. I don't think it's that salient of a one, but it does bespeak of causation.

And, you know, and now the other issue that's being raised is are you precluded, you, the plaintiffs, precluded from now making this worth less, two words, argument because Judge Kugler ruled that you were not making these allegations before that the risks were so material, therefore, the benefits did not outweigh the risk. I don't know. I'll have to go back and look at that.

MR. SLATER: Well, if we're going to follow what Judge Kugler did on the summary judgment motions, he said there's enough here, you're going to a jury with this question.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. And that's why I said, I have to kind of somewhat reconcile the motion to dismiss with the summary judgment.

MR. SLATER: Right.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And perhaps somewhere along the line the pleadings changed. I don't know. There were a couple of different motion to dismiss orders.

MR. SLATER: The other thing is, and I think just	to				
relate this to because I know Your Honor's focused on the	9				
Zantac decision, I think one of the real problems that Judge	Э				
Rosenberg wrestled with in Zantac that we don't have here is	S				
she found that the plaintiffs' experts I believe could not					
reliably tell you how much was there actually in the pills					
because of the way that the NDMA was formed at different time	nes.				
And she said if you can't figure that out, you can't go					
anywhere, because you can't tell them how much it was. We					
don't have that problem in this case.					
In this case we have their testing showing massive	∋,				
hundreds of times the levels the FDA ultimately applied. A	nd				
at the time it was sold the level that was allowed was zero	•				
So it's a very different case.					
And, look, we think that this case should go to to	rial				
on all the claims. We think that we should go to trial. The	ne				
summary judgment motions and rulings said we can go to tria	1				
with, which is the warranty claim can go forward. They can					
make their argument on efficacy. The jury can let the					

horserace be played and they can decide which horse wins or by how much.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why shouldn't I try the personal injury cases first?

MR. SLATER: Well, because we've had this litigation going for over five years.

1 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. 2 MR. SLATER: We have no -- I will say, we have no 3 problem with getting the personal injury cases -- and we're 4 ready to have that conversation -- going and get onto a track to get them prepared. But we need to start trying cases here. 5 6 We need to start to bring things to a head. And, look, if Your 7 Honor is --8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No one is working harder, 9 respectfully, to make that happen. 10 MR. SLATER: I know that, Judge. I was not 11 suggesting you weren't. You're just asking from our 12 perspective. 13 Maybe one way to handle it, if Your Honor decides 14 that the warranty claim is too problematic from your perspective, you can always decide to try the other two claims. 15 16 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm not trying more trials than I 17 need to. 18 MR. SLATER: We're ready to go to trial in --19 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't think you are. I don't think the parties are. There is such a huge disconnect. 20 21 don't even know how I do the jury charges. 22 MR. SLATER: That's --23 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: There's such a disconnect to me. 24 I'm going to go back, I'll take a look at the jury charges. 25 want to confer with Judge Vanaskie.

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               But I -- I don't think you are.
                            Well, let me --
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               MR. SLATER:
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't think -- there is such a
     disconnect between the parties.
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               I mean, you folks can't even agree on the words
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     you're going to use to the jury. You can't even agree on the
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     fact that genotoxic really doesn't mean genotoxic.
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                            We'll, we're not saying that.
               MR. SLATER:
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I'm exaggerating a little
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     bit.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Look, Judge, respectfully, I think that
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     a lot of what's happening here is the defendants are not being
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     reasonable, and they're fighting over every single issue.
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     think I've just heard when I was making some notes before, if I
     misheard, I can be corrected, I think that they just argued
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     that their expert didn't concede that the cGMPs were violated
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     by ZHP and they want to make that a fact question. He conceded
     it on the stand, Dr. Afnan. They want to now try the issue
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     that their only expert conceded?
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well --
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               MR. SLATER: I mean, that's unreasonable. And I
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     think the Court is going to need to step in, and we have that
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     issue for the PTO. That's been -- their expert has conceded --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Are you talking about Dr. Afnan?
               MR. SLATER:
25
                            Yeah. He conceded that they violated
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matter.

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cGMPs. He conceded he agrees with the FDA. But they still
want to try the issue of whether or not they violated cGMPs.
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mean, they won't agree to anything.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I do recall he made a
concession, but I thought that he wanted to explain his answer
or something like that. But, you know, I don't need to get
into that. I'm not going to -- look, I can't make them
stipulate to it.
         MR. SLATER: I understand. Well, maybe what we have
to do is enter a directed verdict then, because when Judge
Kugler decided the summary judgment motions, their expert
hadn't changed his position and admitted that cGMPs were
violated when we moved for summary judgment on cGMPs. Now he's
conceded it. So they have no expert to dispute it.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Didn't you ask him the question,
though, did the FDA find that the cGMPs had been violated?
         MR. SLATER: What I said is -- well, first of all, he
said --
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MR. SLATER: It doesn't. Look, I was using it as an example for I think that you're being put in a situation where the defendants are fighting on every single issue, and they're not being reasonable, frankly, and that's why we can't agree on things. And I was giving you that example which I just heard.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, you know what, it doesn't

So that was the reason for that. I'm not trying to pull the Court into a rabbit hole.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I'm going to give Judge Vanaskie all the props that he deserves for handling all of these issues.

I'll just circle back to where I kind of started, which is, you know, the defendants very vigorously, when I was assigned this case, argued that this is not the case to try first. They had reasons there. I considered them. And I thought that they were — the problems that they discussed, I thought that they were surmountable, and I thought that the case could move forward.

But I have to admit, every time we get together, it becomes -- I become less convinced that this is the right way to proceed, because I just -- there's such a disconnect between the parties.

I do think it's not been wasted time. I think we've come a long way in funneling things and distilling things and getting a better understanding of the case. So I would like to believe that none of this time has been wasted. I think it's been productive.

MR. SLATER: Judge, we're not going to be any more agreeable if you shift to the personal injury cases. It's going to be the same show.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. But I'm going to have clarity

and I'm going to have time and I'm going to lay out within four corners of an opinion as to what's in, what's out, what the claims are and what the claims aren't. And that will be our roadmap.

Because right now, I don't know how to say this, right now I think there's a lot of "this" going on. And --

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, if the issue is the warranty claim, counsel just asked you to grant summary judgment on our warranty claim, because that's where this issue comes in. It's not an issue with the consumer protection or the fraud where there's active misconduct. Your Honor said that before.

So you know what, let them make the motion. If Your Honor thinks that our warranty claim should be bounced, you'll dismiss it and we can try the other two claims and we'll have our rights and we'll move forward. If you want to let it go forward with -- I mean, I think that would be the wrong outcome because we think that Judge Kugler was correct to say that the value question is for the jury and that we're allowed to put Dr. Conti on to say there was no value and here's why, based on my assumptions. I think that should go forward like that.

If Your Honor wants to listen to their argument and say you know what, you guys want general causation so badly and you think that's what's needed to balance, then we have to try general causation. They can't complain about it because they asked for it over our objection.

So, you know --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.

MR. SLATER: -- however it goes, I think that
we're -- we want to try this case. We have -- this litigation
has been going on for five years. At some point we need to
bring it to the point where we get to trials, because we're
never going to get to the end unless we have trials. And if
this trial gets put off and we go on to a new track, the
defendants are going to exhale, and that's going to be the end
of anything bringing us to any conclusion. And they're going
to say, great, we can bill for this thing for the next five
years while we try personal injury cases, and it will go on
forever, and the companies can hold their money in their bank
accounts and not worry about it because it's going to go on
forever.

And that's the practical reality of what it is. That's why we want to get to trial.

COVID destroyed this litigation. It put us on such a slow track. It's the reality. We had to deal with it. We lost over two years. And it just -- it just -- it put a giant crimp in it. But we want to try the case. And I think that the suggestions I'm making which is, A, follow Judge Kugler's decision, let us try the case, let them argue efficacy, let the jury make the call. If you want to let in general causation, we have to live with it, we'll try it. If you want to put

guardrails around that how much can come in, fine. Your Honor has the right to do that.

I think you should give a limiting instruction. If there's no general causation, you explain it. Even if there is general causation, you explain how it factors in. If it factors in on value but not on liability, then we live with it. But we are ready to try this case.

Judge Vanaskie has been busting his butt -- I think I can say that in the court -- on these designations. The testimony is basically set for most of the witnesses in the trial. We've done an enormous amount of work. We've already gotten ready for trial now twice with a massive investment of time and money. We're sitting here holding off hotels right now because they want contracts signed and we're telling them we're not signing anything because we're not sure what's happening right now. We want to try this case. We want to go to a verdict. We want to live with the outcome. And we want to get it done.

And there's nothing about this -- I understand that there's frustration that we're not agreeing. We're not going to agree. This is high-stakes litigation with three of the biggest law firms in the world, and they're not going to agree. These are big companies overseas that don't seem to really care. And they don't seem to care what they did. That's why they're minimizing what they sold into this market. That's why

they keep saying "no harm, no foul." I mean, I'm just calling it like it is. And we need to go to trial. We need to move this, and that's why -- I'm not saying it's unreasonable to say we got to get these personal injury cases going, too. We're ready to do that. We're ready. We have bellwethers from years ago that were picked.

And we have a way that we can present to Your Honor in short term to say, look, on another track, let's get these personal injury cases going. I'm dying to try a personal injury case in this, especially with ZHP's massively contaminated pills. Let's go. Let's do it. Let's start with the liver — they already think those cases have no value, they're all garbage. Let's try the liver cancer cases. Let's line them up and let's start trying them soon. We'll get specific causation experts. We'll do what we need to do to work them up, but we shouldn't put that ahead of this because this gets thrown off after all the work we've done when there is a way to try this case. And I think, Your Honor, we can definitely do it. We've talked through this stuff.

I don't think any of this time has been wasted. We have learned a lot about our case. Your Honor has learned a lot. The defense has learned a lot just through this process. I think a lot has been refined.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. I don't think the time has been wasted.

MR. SLATER: No.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I'm glad you agree with that,

3 | but --

MR. SLATER: The testimony has been worked on. I mean, we'd have to put a little more testimony back in or whatever it is on general cause that we've pulled out. It's not going to be a big deal. Judge Vanaskie is the fastest decider in the West on this stuff.

But we adamantly don't want this case kicked. We really need to go to trial. If you talk about maybe we need to move it a month or so, nobody's going to cry about that because that's life and it happens. But putting it off indefinitely with all the work we've done, all the money we've spent, all the time we've put into it, that would be very, very prejudicial to us.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It does seem, though, that the case has been somewhat of a moving target. I think the parties have to agree with that. I think that there has been a fine-tuning of the case. I think that there has been greater clarity that's been, you know, by just having these arguments, I think. And so it hasn't been time that's been wasted.

And I'm certainly grateful that they're happening now and not over, you know, all these sidebars while the jury sits waiting.

Does anybody want to respond to what Mr. Slater is

proposing?

MS. ALLON: I -- I could start. So, I think there's a problem with the warranty claim, as Mr. Ostfeld said.

If the proposal is we're going to put general cause in the case, which is what I understand Mr. Slater to be saying — leaving aside the fact that right now he says he has 85 hours of video without general cause, so I don't even know how long the trial would be with general cause, but let's leave the timing aside.

Where I think we are is, he has one theory that is in this case, and it is worthless, one word. That is the only theory that survived the motion to dismiss. But more importantly, it's the only theory that has any evidence, expert evidence, assuming that some version of Dr. Conti is allowed in by this Court.

And so in that version of the trial, he will argue that the pills were worth zero because they cause cancer. And the defendants will get to say, number one, they didn't cause cancer.

Number two, they had therapeutic value.

And number three, had you not bought these pills, you would have had to buy more expensive alternatives.

He cannot then come back and say to the jury, well, if it's not zero, just pick a number. That would be diminution in value. That's been dismissed by Judge Kugler, but he

doesn't have a witness, he doesn't have evidence of if it's not zero, what is the value.

As Mr. Ostfeld said, he would have had to have done a survey or other economic evidence that would have shown diminution in value, and he didn't do that.

So if we're going to go all or nothing on worthlessness, one word, then that's the confines of the trial. So I don't think we can do it in four weeks, obviously. But that is the confines.

In terms of personal injury versus economic loss, we were always of the view that it made sense to start with personal injury. In my experience in these cases, Zantac is a good example, personal injury always goes first for this reason. Judge Kugler disagreed. You know, this Court said it didn't — it wasn't originally going to revisit Judge Kugler's ruling, so we find ourselves where we find ourselves. I don't think any of us has changed our view that if we were on a clean slate, we would start with personal injury, for all of the reasons that we discussed this morning.

To your point, it just -- the issue of causation is much more focused. It's the only thing you're dealing with. You don't have any of these ancillary issues. We try the personal injury case. So we would have been happy to do that, and I think we are happy to do that. So the view of that has not changed.

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But if we're going to do economic loss, it has to be with those clear confines. It cannot now become a diminution-in-value case, because that would be a new case that has a claim that was dismissed by Judge Kugler, but also has a claim that has not been developed or tested through any discovery. MS. LOCKARD: Your Honor, on behalf of Teva, we would agree with that. As Ms. Allon has said, we've always maintained that the quickest, the best, the easiest path is the personal injury case. I agree that all the work we've done, including Judge Vanaskie, thank you, can be applied to those PI cases. I think I heard Mr. Slater say that the Court could grant directed verdict on the express warranty claim. That goes up. Meanwhile, we shift gears, we pivot, we get the PI case ready to go. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, no, I don't think he said that. He said I could grant summary judgment, but then he

that. He said I could grant summary judgment, but then he would appeal that. So why would I do that without consideration? If he wants to dismiss his claim, that's a different story.

MS. LOCKARD: Understood.

I think the same logic holds, though, with respect to moving forward on the PI. We get general cause issues decided by the jury. We get the meat of the liability decided by the

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            I mean, not to hold out hope for settlement, but if
     jury.
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     there is any way to move the parties closer together is to get
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     some resolution of some of these issues through a jury.
               MS. DAVIDSON: Your Honor, I don't want to repeat
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     what the other two defendants just said, but obviously the
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     typical process in a mass tort is bellwether trials of personal
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                     We've obviously pleaded very hard for that.
     injury claims.
 8
     didn't happen. But we obviously agree that is a simpler,
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     clearer approach. This is a huge behemoth. There is also
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     clearly at this point not a reasonable way to try this in the
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     time allotted in November and, therefore, we would strongly
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     support pivoting to something that's actually doable and is not
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     sort of this -- this Frankenstein type of a situation.
14
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               I'm going to mull it over. I want to talk to Judge
     Vanaskie. I want to think about it some more.
16
17
               (Court conferring with Judge Vanaskie.)
18
               JUDGE VANASKIE: I have a conference tomorrow.
19
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. So you'll hear from me by
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     the early evening.
21
               Yeah.
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               MR. OSTFELD: Your Honor, on that point, Judge
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     Vanaskie very kindly gave us until 5:00 p.m. today for a
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     redline of the final pretrial order.
25
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Everything's on hold until I
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1	decide.
2	MR. OSTFELD: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right, Judge Vanaskie?
4	JUDGE VANASKIE: Yes.
5	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.
6	MR. SLATER: That's fine. Because we have been
7	exchanging anyway.
8	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Just put everything on hold for
9	the next three or four hours. I have to think about this. I
10	want to think about it. I'll issue a text order; you'll know
11	where I stand, okay?
12	MR. SLATER: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	MS. ALLON: Thank you, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good to see you all. Thank you.
15	MR. OSTFELD: Thank you, Your Honor.
16	MS. DAVIDSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	MS. LOCKARD: Thank you, Your Honor.
18	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
19	(Proceedings concluded at 3:20 p.m.)
20	FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
21	
22	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
23	from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
24	
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